Motive Professionals Draw on Decades of Experience to support USACAPOC CPX

Ft. Leavenworth, KS - Soldiers preparing for overseas deployment spend weeks and months ensuring they are ready for anything. Preparations include individual training, unit training, and training for entire Battalions.  Each level of training requires soldiers to hone specialized skills so that they are ready to fight and win on any battlefield.  For soldiers from United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC), it’s no different.  But in addition to practicing soldier skills from marksmanship to maneuvering, participating in exercises that provide real-world cultural and professional experiences in a training environment are even more crucial to their success. 

Motive International excels in that environment by providing subject matter experts with tailored experiences relevant to specific training audiences.  In the case of the latest USACAPOC Command Post Exercise, held at the Mission Training Complex in Leavenworth, Kansas, Motive brought five subject matter experts, each with decades of experience, in defense, diplomacy, development, and humanitarian response.  

As a social enterprise with a mission to mitigate conflict and enhance stability and sustainability in communities around the globe, Motive International works with governments, private sector organizations, and civil society partners to advance stability through training and education, client programs, and pro-bono impact initiatives.  A long-term partner with USACAPOC, Motive supports multiple command post exercises across the country to support training objectives. 

“This is my third USACAPOC exercise, and by far, this training audience has been very focused,” explained Marc Boyd, a 32-year Navy veteran and Motive subject matter expert.  “I’ve been impressed by the training audience’s early and active engagement with the role players, asking formative and probing questions to determine the best way to respond to the emerging humanitarian and security crisis that is highlighted in the exercise.” 

During this exercise that supported multiple units, including 360th Civil Affairs Brigade, 426th Civil Affairs Battalion, 492nd Civil Affairs Battalion, 15th Psychological Operations Battalion, 4th Psychological Operations Group, and the 303rd Army Service Component Command Detachment (Information Operations), Boyd served as a role player as a U.S. Embassy Public Diplomacy Officer, a representative of the United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and as a local freelance journalist.   

Richard Albright provides insight about humanitarian response and international development.

“After 32 years as a Navy Public Affairs Officer working in several U.S. Embassies and operational commands around the world, I joined the United Nations as a program manager for the International Organization for Migration,” Boyd said. “I supported humanitarian programs in West Africa, Libya, Somalia, and Washington, DC.  Exercises like this allow me to share my military experience and my experience supporting humanitarian initiatives overseas.” 

While this exercise series focused on a fictitious country in a tumultuous region, the scenario is one that could be ripped out of today’s headlines: One nation is overrun by an overzealous neighbor to gain access to the area’s natural resources. A coalition of countries band together to support a United Nations Security Council Resolution to restore the country’s democratically elected government, while restoring security and stability to the region. 

Richard Albright used decades of experience in humanitarian response and international development to enhance training. He brings a unique perspective to Motive’s team, having served as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the U.S State Department’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) coordinating with other State bureaus, USG agencies, and the U.S Congress to ensure the advancement of U.S policy priorities.

As role players, Motive’s subject matter experts help training audiences develop solutions to difficult challenges presented in the scenario.  They also learn how they will interact with United Action Partners, such as U.S. interagency partners; United Nations Humanitarian Country Team members; international non-government organizations; and host nation government representatives at all levels, from national to local. Members of the training audience also get a chance to conduct civil engagements with key leaders in the host country. 

With subject matter experts serving in several roles, Motive’s role players recalled their experience to ensure the training audience had realistic encounters with Unified Action Partners. 

“Motive International has an extremely deep bench of subject matter experts across the spectrum of all military and civilian lines of effort,” explained Pasquale “Pat” Capriglione, a 35-year veteran of the U.S. Department of State where he served as a senior Regional Security Officer and a Provincial Reconstruction Team Commander in al-Anbar, Iraq. 

Capriglione is also a veteran of supporting these types of command post exercises, with more than 42 exercises under his belt, and says these missions help prepare units who may serve or interact with U.S. Embassies or interagency partners overseas. 

“The training audience has learned the U.S. Ambassador’s role in military conflicts occurring in their area of operation,” Capriglione stated.  “The training audience has also learned the roles of each respective Country Team Member and the equities they bring to the fight.” 

As a team of role players, Motive’s subject matter experts provide decades of real-world experience and serve as a resource for the training audience as they participate in their command post exercise. 

“Motive is uniquely suited to provide this kind of training because no other organization has the mix of backgrounds and depth of experience, both peacetime and conflict, as well as a deep and intuitive understanding of how operations in the field interact with political-level actions in Washington,” said Laird Treiber, a 31-year veteran as an Economic Officer with the U.S. State Department who now focuses on promoting trade and investment and teaches about global economy at George Washington University. “Motive is uniquely placed to translate the strategic imperatives of any successful action into unit-level inputs, and model how those interactions would take place in the real world.” 

“Motive doesn’t just provide role players; they provide professionals with decades of specialized experience that is directly related to the task,” Boyd explained.  “In the case of this Command Post Exercise for United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command, our five consultants come a variety of backgrounds within the U.S. military, U.S. State Department, and United Nations, that is tailored to the training scenario. 

One of those professionals, U.S. Army Col. (ret.) John Maraia, served 28 years as an Infantry officer with the 82nd Airborne and a Special Forces Officer. “I spent the bulk of my career in the 1st Special Forces Group where I commanded from the detachment- to battalion-level, followed by command of Special Operations Command – Forward Lebanon. Staff assignments ranged from U.S. Embassy Jakarta to U.S. Joint Forces Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, the Office of the Secretary of the Army, The Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense,” Maraia said.   

John Maraia meets with USACAPOC soldiers in an exercise scenario.

His wealth of experience is well-suited to provide realistic examples to the training audience.  

“I think I’ve been able to introduce concepts to the training audience based on my personal experience interacting with Country Teams and host-nation partners,” Maraia explained.  “Motive has the proven ability to bring together highly experienced personnel to portray the range of agencies with whom the U.S. military needs to be able to engage and collaborate.” 

Learning appropriate ways of engaging and collaborating with various stakeholders in any conflict or humanitarian response is one of the most important take-aways from the exercise, according to Boyd. 

“I have a couple of goals in these exercises,” Boyd said. “One goal is to ensure the training audience learns the importance of coordinating activities and synchronizing communication with all relevant stakeholders. This is an important skill to practice during the exercise but is critically important in the real world.  When our troops deploy overseas, they will want to ensure that all relevant players are aware of their objectives.  These military units, especially those in Civil Affairs, will want to ensure their activities are coordinated with the U.S. Country Team, host nation military commanders, and Unified Action Partners.” 

“The second goal I want to convey is to think of the team at the U.S. Embassy as a resource,” Boyd continued.  “They can provide invaluable information that is needed to produce a well-informed plan.  Soldiers just need to reach out to their State Department colleagues who will, in most cases, be more than willing to share information.” 

Maraia agreed, stating exercises like this, “sensitizes the training audience to the need to coordinate with both their U.S. government partners and the host nation.” 

Motive’s ability to find subject matter experts eager to share their experiences seems to be paying off. 

“From my perspective,” Maraia said, “this training audience is leaning farther forward on engaging the United Action Partners than I’ve seen during previous exercises.” 

Treiber agreed.  “This is my second exercise, and it's been fascinating to see how different training audiences approached the same scenario. Both exercises have underscored just how important it is for both military units and civilian agencies to understand how the other part of the team thinks and their capacities - as well as what they cannot do or won't do,” said Treiber.  “This kind of exercise is a great opportunity to highlight the art of the possible for what can work - and what isn't as productive. It's also been amazing to see how creative some of the training units are in terms of thinking up new approaches and lines of effort.” 

Boyd seconded that opinion. “What I’ve learned is that when the training audience uses all the resources available to them, such as role players, they are able to develop better solutions more quickly, allowing unit commanders to make more informed decisions.” 

By allowing Soldiers to practice cultural and professional skills learned in a training environment, Motive is helping Soldiers become better prepared to respond appropriately and successfully in any overseas environment.   

 You can read more about Motive’s robust training and exercise support portfolio on our website. When you are ready to learn more about how Motive subject matter experts can enhance your upcoming training event, please contact us today!

Countering Adversary Efforts to Divert Sensitive Technologies

Summary

Top: Automated Delivery Robot (stock photo)

Bottom: US Army Titan Robot with Protector Javelin (QinetiQ file photo)

Malign actors have recently increased their efforts to gain access to strategic and sensitive technologies that can provide an advantage on the battlefield, a threat that requires urgent understanding and response. This threat is particularly acute in the Baltic states, which face a unique set of circumstances in the control of strategic goods. The Baltics are home to some of the EU’s most vibrant innovation ecosystems, which excel in the development of technologies most desired by malign actors seeking to develop advanced weapons, including autonomous weapons.[1]  Baltic industry and academia produce world-class artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML), sensor technology, blockchain encryption, machine vision, robotics, and other emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs). Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has increased Kremlin demand for these military-relevant technologies and intensified malign efforts to acquire them from nearby Baltic states. Our extensive engagement culminated in tabletop exercises (TTXs) hosted by Motive International in late 2022 that simulated malign actor diversion tactics against government and industry in the Baltics and illuminated regulatory and capability gaps and opportunities to strengthen policy and practice.  Recommendations include specific changes in how industry, government, and multi-lateral organizations identify threats and collaborate to counter them.

The Innovators Next Door Project

Tabletop exercise materials from the Innovators Next Door Project event in Vilnius, Lithuania in October 2022. (Motive photo)

In 2021, Motive International, funded by the U.S. Department of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program, launched the Innovators Next Door Project in partnership Lithuania’s and Latvia’s Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and industry partners in Estonia. In the Project’s first year, Motive meticulously mapped each country’s stakeholder and threat landscape, carried out expert analysis of national and Baltic-wide technology diversion dynamics, and engaged extensively with hundreds of representatives from industry, academia, civil society, national governments, and the European Commission. These activities informed in-person tabletop exercises (TTX) in Vilnius and Riga in October 2022. The TTXs presented government and industry stakeholders with simulated diversion threat scenarios, prompting them to respond through interactive gameplay. Motive facilitated and scored the game based on how well participants were able to recognize and mitigate diversion risks. Following the exercise, national policy leaders, legal experts, and industry executives led workshops to discuss gaps revealed in the exercise and identify concrete options to strengthen counter-diversion policy, practice, and cross-sector coordination. Project findings and recommendations are presented below.

Gaps in Prevailing Policy and Practice 

Transatlantic alignment and coordination on sanctions, export control regimes, and investment screening is robust, yet significant policy and practice gaps remain. Several categories or sub-categories of dual-use technology (e.g., some quantum, biotechnology, advanced material, and software) are not subject to licensing or reporting requirements under EU regimes. Furthermore, U.S. and EU export controls lack the ability or authority to regulate certain intangible technology transfers (ITT). Many European governments lack adequate foreign investment screening regulations or treat foreign investment separately from strategic goods control. Such policy gaps allow malign actors to acquire sensitive items through lawful means including purchases, joint research, mergers and acquisitions. 

In addition to regulatory gaps, most governments around the world have sub-optimal mechanisms to coordinate with the entities whose technologies face the greatest risk for diversion, namely industry and academic institutions that handle EDTs. The lack of familiarity and trust between government and industry, bandwidth constraints, and absence of formal mandates for governments to conduct industry outreach contribute to sub-optimal coordination. The uptick in diversion attempts by Kremlin actors has magnified this shortcoming. This is particularly true in industry segments such as autonomy-enabling AI/ML algorithms, sensor integration software, and cloud data platforms, which are largely ungoverned by export control regimes and where government-to-industry connections are most nascent. Mounting evidence shows these are precisely the segments of greatest interest to military and intelligence apparatuses of Russia, China, and others, underscoring the need for improved coordination as an important counter-diversion safeguard.[2]

Recent diversion incidents offer evidence of this need. In 2018, Russian operatives targeted an unsuspecting cloud computing company in Lithuania to divert software and data for use in Kremlin missile launching systems. [3] Despite working in a sensitive domain, the Lithuanian firm had not considered the possible military applications of their technology and therefore lacked basic safeguards to prevent nefarious acquisition of their data or software. While the Lithuanian government used its investment screening mechanisms to stop a Kremlin-backed company from investing in the Lithuanian firm, this example demonstrates that, absent government outreach, firms and institutions that transact largely in the commercial, non-security sector, remain unaware of the dual-use nature of their innovations, much less of policies and practices related to strategic goods control.

Key Findings 

By deeply examining and simulating the dynamics described above with regional stakeholders, Motive’s Innovators Next Door Project identified the following gaps and conditions as key contributing factors to unmitigated diversion risk in the Baltic tech sector:  

Export Control Loopholes:  Existing national export control regimes in the region do not adequately address “grey zone” items and situations. For example, export control lists maintained in EU framework law (Regulation (EU) 2021/821) that correspond with national regulations exclude entire categories of dual-use EDTs (e.g., most software and some advanced hardware), leaving sensitive technologies outside the jurisdiction of most regulatory controls. Moreover, myriad situations involving intangible technology transfers (ITT) are not subject to export licensing or reporting requirements.

Divergent National Regulations: Although the EU’s export control regime falls under EU common trade policy, individual member states have discretion to implement frameworks with wide latitude and have minimal obligations to enforce or honor determinations made by other member states. This means an export license or investment denial made by one competent authority does not guarantee a neighboring EU state will make the same decision for the identical transaction. In other words, the denial of an export license in one member state is not binding on other member states. Rules surrounding government obligations to report or share information or rationale on license denials is voluntary and can be inconsistent, limiting the effectiveness of systems intended to harmonize export controls across the EU. Divergent national regulation undermines the idea of a common application of export controls and incentivizes both licit and illicit actors to seek out more lenient states in which to operate.

Oversight Blind Spots: Although transactions for items not on the EU export control list can be denied by national authorities under “catch all” authority, this rarely occurs because authorities are not generally aware of transactions involving “unlisted” items. In other words, regulators cannot regulate what they are not aware of.  Compounding blind spots is a general hesitation among officials to exercise catch all denial authority, if and when they do identify a suspicious transaction.

Unique Aspects of Non-Traditional Exports:  There is uncertainty at the EU and national levels about jurisdiction over strategic goods transactions that take place entirely in the cyber domain, such as software transfers, and those that involve transfer of items to foreign entities or individuals physically present in the EU – a situation referred to as “deemed” exports in the U.S. context. These kinds of transactions remain largely ungoverned, allowing malign actors to acquire sensitive items and know-how lawfully simply by transacting while physically present in the EU or on digital platforms that lack clear national jurisdiction.

Foreign Investment Vulnerabilities: Many countries have procedures for export control and foreign investment screening, but the two are often applied separately, with the latter not routinely viewed through the lens of strategic goods control. As a result, a nefarious actor may gain access to sensitive EDTs by becoming a beneficiary of a firm in an industry segment not routinely subject to foreign investment screening. Furthermore, most foreign investment restrictions only apply when the total value or beneficiary share is above a certain threshold, allowing foreign access to sensitive technologies or IP through small-scale investments.

Lack of Integration with Business Promotion Arms of Government: Government investment and innovation promotion agencies tend not to be meaningfully engaged in strategic goods control within their own governments, which both misses opportunities for inter-ministerial information exchange and may create risk. Business promotion agencies have unique insights on market dynamics that could enrich the government’s threat picture or provide actionable information on specific licensing or investment cases if they were better integrated in strategic goods regulation. Moreover, more integration could reduce the risk of business promotion agencies inadvertently enabling nefarious foreign investments or cross-border collaborations.

Minimal Government-Industry Collaboration: Last, but perhaps our most significant and addressable finding, is the lack of effective mechanisms for strategic goods regulators to interact with the industry actors at greatest risk of having their technologies targeted for diversion. Few channels exist for officials to educate industry about threats or for the two sectors to exchange information on issues of concern. This prevents the two sides from enhancing their collective threat picture, results in industry being uninformed of current policies, and forecloses opportunities to craft policy that protects national security and business interests. It also limits government visibility and understanding of “grey zone” transactions and trends described above. In some cases, lack of cross-sector interaction stems from distrust or wariness of government, with firms routinely finding ways to operate just below the threshold of regulatory reach to reduce compliance burdens, minimize delays, or simply to avoid interacting with government. While firms that serve the defense and broader government sector often interact with strategic goods regulators, EDT developers that engage purely in commercial transactions or academic research are often unaware of the dual use potential of their technology and even less aware of policies and best practices to safeguard it. This leaves unsuspecting firms – often in the segments of greatest interest to malign actors -- highly vulnerable to diversion tactics.

A Way Forward: A Capability-Based Approach

 While current conditions allow weapons-relevant technologies to proliferate, opportunities to reduce risk abound. The Innovators Next Door Project articulated core government and industry capabilities that can significantly reduce diversion risks and safeguard strategic goods (Table 1.) The Project’s simulation-based learning and cross-sector dialogue helped reveal and address capability shortfalls and demonstrated the extent to which risk can be reduced when stakeholders are proficient in these knowledge and skill areas.

Table 1. Core Capabilities for Reducing Diversion Risks

Within and far beyond the Baltics, this capability-based framework has broad geographic relevance and could set the stage for a new international paradigm for strategic goods control. Such a paradigm expands the frame beyond an “export control” issue, rethinks prevailing policy and practice, prioritizes coordination within and beyond governments, and is guided by the following principles:

·      Understanding that government strategic goods control structures and processes must be inter-disciplinary, agile, proactive, and adaptive;

·      Appreciating that industry has a wide range of vital, often voluntary, tools to mitigate diversion risks and should be treated by governments as partners;

·      Accepting that formal regulations cannot cover every possible scenario, item, or entity involved in diversion risks; and

·      Recognizing that controls come with trade-offs in innovation and must be carefully balanced.

Recommendations

In response to the findings above, and consistent with the strategic goods control paradigm above, Motive and our Project stakeholders developed the following recommended actions for industry and government consideration:

Sharpen Government Roles and Responsibilities: Governments could designate a single national focal point with the mandate and stature to engage at a whole of government scale and serve as a single point of entry for industry and academia when it comes to strategic goods control. Inter-ministerial commissions and cooperation frameworks are a start, but often lack sufficient aperture or authority to overcome intra-government silos or lack the mandate to proactively engage with non-governmental stakeholders. We recommend that outreach to industry and academia be an explicit function - on par with licensing, investment screening, policy formulation, and threat monitoring - of national focal point entities. 

Re-Imagine Government-Industry Collaboration: Those who develop and trade in dual use technologies have a vested interest in preventing diversion and nefarious use of these goods both as a matter of protecting proprietary innovations and market-wide reputations. For this reason, we encourage policy and regulatory officials to view industry and academia as partners in strategic goods control and to pro-actively set-up mechanisms that facilitate cross-sector collaboration. These might include: 

·      Channels for government to disseminate threat and regulatory updates directly to industry or through industry association or cluster entity nodes, especially those active in high-risk EDT segments.

·      Portals that allow industry to submit inquiries to government – potentially anonymously - and receive timely responses related to compliance, specific transactions, or the risk landscape.

·      Mechanisms that enable government officials to easily access industry experts for case-specific consultations or for inputs to new policies or strategies.

·      Collaborative efforts to map and maintain updated listings of firms and institutes that develop or trade in certain EDTs, with mutual agreement on how this list will/will not be used or disclosed, such as for outreach in the spirit of partnership not enforcement or oversight.

·      Co-created standards and frameworks for determining dual use applications of commercial EDTs and for identifying technologies at highest risk of diversion.

·      Forums that bring together industry, strategic goods officials, and business promotion agency representatives to discuss emerging trends and align standards and strategies. 

·      Specific mandates for industry associations or cluster entities to take on a coordination role between government and industry and/or to serve as an advisory body to government on strategic goods control matters that impact their constituents.

·      Webinars, online resources, or events organized by government that help industry adopt Know Your Customer (KYC) and related due diligence best practices, Internal Compliance Programs (ICPs) tailored for EDT segments and entities of various sizes/stages, and other safeguards.

·      On-demand consults with government or self-help resources that allow firms to create an index of the items they handle, cross-referenced with the relevant export controls, sanctions, investment screening requirements, or reporting that is either required or recommended for each item.

Improve Multilateral Alignment:  The EU and EU member states, along with the United States and other leading innovating economies could work toward developing a “Common Operating Picture” of technology diversion vulnerabilities and set new standards for strategic goods control best practices. This could start with the adoption of the core capabilities framework presented above and a commitment to achieving proficiency in each area. Additionally, we recommend the following options for specific key institutions:

·      The EU’s Working Party on Dual-Use Goods could document and share best practices from across member states of industry outreach mechanisms, work to harmonize member state export control lists and investment screening regimes, and application of catch-all authorities.

·      NATO could establish a Centre of Excellence on Sensitive Dual-Use Technologies that develops a training curriculum on strategic goods control best practices for governments and industry in member states; NATO could also ensure the forthcoming Defense Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) requires participating entities to demonstrate best practices for protecting their technologies from diversion, such as having ICPs tailored to their organization.

·      A G7 Working Group on Strategic Trade Controls could coordinate G7 counter-diversion policies and practices as a complement to the work of G7 Foreign and Trade Ministers on Russia sanctions, global trade flows, and supply chain resiliency.  

·      A dialogue with key partners in Asia could be established to examine and share information about the diversion tactics and techniques used by the PRC and their state-aligned entities, then proactively educate industry in the region and encourage them to embrace capabilities and best practices described in this paper.

Conclusion

Countries with vibrant EDT ecosystems and proximity to adversaries are particularly vulnerable to the threat of technology diversion. The Baltic states offer illustrative examples. The region’s relatively small number of affected industry entities, and capable, open governments create conditions for targeted policy reforms and intimate cross-sector collaboration. That said, we believe the Innovators Next Door Project approach and findings have relevance well beyond the Baltics to national and regional context across the globe. We believe a capability-based framework and partnership-oriented mindset between government and industry - no matter the geography – are key to thwart diversion of sensitive technologies while balancing national security imperatives with diverse stakeholder interests.

Participants at the Innovators Next Door event in Vilnius, pictured above, included representatives from the domestic tech industry, academia, civil society, NATO, the U.S. State Department, inter-ministerial officials from the Lithuanian government, and others. (Motive Photo)

[1] Technologies covered include robotics, machine vision, artificial intelligence/machine learning, blockchain, encryption, sensors and IT networking,

[2] https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/silicon-lifeline-western-electronics-heart-russias-war-machine

[3]Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, National Threat Assessment, 2019.  https://www.vsd.lt/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/2019-Gresmes-internetui-EN.pdf

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Countering Hybrid Warfare: Mapping Social Contracts to Reinforce Societal Resiliency in Estonia and Beyond

Salamah Magnuson, Morgan Keay, Kimberly Metcalf

Kremlin-backed hybrid warfare — a whole-of-society warfare on the political, economic, and social fabric of societies — has put states in the Kremlin’s crosshairs on high alert. These states remain vulnerable to hybrid threats partly because they lack appropriate tools to identify and mitigate efforts that foment political instability. Motive International developed the Social Contract Assessment Tool (SCAT) and applied a society-centric analysis in Estonia to evaluate vulnerability to or resilience against hybrid threats. Our research revealed that ethnic-Russian Estonians who speak Russian as the primary household language perceive institutions that embrace their dual identity as Estonian citizens and as ethnic Russians as legitimate and perceive institutions that challenge this dual identity as divisive. This research demonstrated the utility of the SCAT to characterize social cohesion relevant to national policy, security, and civil resistance efforts in the context of hybrid warfare.

Read on in Texas National Security Review Vol 5, Iss 2 Spring 2022

Opening a Conversation About Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS)

Artificial intelligence, machine learning, robotics, and related emerging technologies are reshaping how policymakers and strategists think about national security, strategic stability, and conflict mitigation. These emerging technologies offer the prospect of exponentially faster and more accurate analysis and decision-making, more secure communications, more resilient networks, more precise and cost-effective application of resources, and more comprehensive understanding of the environment in which an individual, company, or government operates. Mastering the development and deployment of these technologies would dramatically enhance a country’s military, economic, and diplomatic capabilities, which is why most countries are rushing to deepen their understanding of AI and expand research and development in AI-related applications.

While some of these technologies are thought to be years away from widespread practical application -– for example, quantum technology or biotechnology for human enhancement – others like AI and machine learning are already being used today in almost all facets of life, including national security. One of the most significant new technologies impacting U.S. national security and the U.S. Department of Defense’s assessment of current and future threats is AI-based autonomous decision-making and its potential use in lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), defined as weapons that are designed to independently select and engage targets without the need for human control. [1] LAWS present us with a thought-provoking array of problem-sets, as the technology is advancing far faster than U.S. policymaking and international diplomatic negotiations can keep pace. Several dozen countries and over 100 non-governmental organizations are demanding that the international community agree under UN auspices to ban LAWS because of ethical concerns over algorithms making lethal decisions autonomously. But U.S. state competitors like China and Russia, not to mention potential non-state adversaries, are already developing and exporting potentially autonomous weapon systems. The incoming Biden Administration will soon be confronted with important decision points about the USG’s R&D, deployment, and potential use of LAWS in combat, the implications of U.S. competitors and adversaries doing the same, and whether this category of weapons and technologies should face more rigorous scrutiny and oversight by an international treaty or agreement.

As a social enterprise deeply committed to mitigating conflict and enhancing stability and sustainability around the globe, Motive International recognizes the urgency of helping policymakers and strategists better understand both the opportunities and threats that LAWS pose to US national security and to regional and global conflict mitigation. Motive is launching a new initiative to help U.S. policymakers, strategists, and other stakeholders better understand the technical, policy, operational, diplomatic, and ethical dimensions that LAWS present, identify gaps in understanding, and frame the policy and operational choices decision-makers will need to consider in the months and years ahead to ensure these technologies promote rather than undermine global peace and stability.

As we develop this initiative, Motive is pleased to recommend to our community of interest the following key reports and resources related to LAWS and related technologies that are shaping how we are thinking about this important topic:

Overviews

“Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems”, Congressional Research Service, December 2020

“Autonomous weapons are a game-changer”, The Economist, January 2018

U.S. (DOD and State Department) Policy and NATO Perspectives

“AI Principles: Recommendations on the Ethical Use of Artificial Intelligence by the Department of Defense”, Defense Innovation Board, October 2019

“Conducting Article 36 Legal Reviews for Lethal Autonomous Weapons”, Jared Cochrane, Journal of Science Policy & Governance, April 2020

Statement by the U.S. Delegation to the UN CCW Group of Government Experts (GGE), March 2019

US Government Response to UN CCW GGE Virtual Dialogue on LAWS

NATO: Science & Technology Trends 2020-2040: Exploring the S&T Edge

NATO: “Autonomous Systems: Issues for Defence Policymakers”

UN Views and Diplomatic Discussions

“International Discussions Concerning Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems”, Congressional Research Service, October 2020

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Report on “Unlocking the Black Box” of autonomous decision-making

Report of the 2019 session of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, September 2019

Think Tank Reports on LAWS Development and Risks

“Redefining Human Control: Lessons from the Battlefield for Autonomous Weapons”, Center for Naval Analyses, March 2018

Who’s Prone to Drone? A Global Time-Series Analysis of Armed Uninhabited Aerial Vehicle Proliferation, Michael Horowitz, October 2020

The Risks of Autonomous Weapons Systems for Crisis Stability and Conflict Escalation in Future U.S.-Russia Confrontations, Burgess Laird, June 2020, RAND blog

NGO Argument to Ban LAWS

“Human Rights Watch (HRW) argument in favor of a Treaty to Ban LAWS” June 2020