Since the toppling of their regime in 2001, the Taliban have demanded recognition from Kabul as a legitimate political actor in a country where they enjoy substantial support among segments of the population, not least for for the economic and infrastructural systems they helped cultivate and on which nearly all rural Afghans depend. The Taliban have a near monopoly on a global commodity representing a $4 billion dollar a year industry that necessitates the sustainment of elaborate supply chains: opium. But a deeper conflict analysis foretells a future in which the Taliban could soon be incentivized not only to walk away from its lucrative drug empire but become an ardent counter-narcotics partner to the Kabul government and its international backers.
From Precedent, Possibility: New Models for "Whole of Society" Foreign Policy
Fragile and conflict-affected regions of the world threaten not only U.S. national security, but the stability and prosperity of markets and society. If we accept that governments, businesses, and citizens all stand to gain by addressing global crises, then a “whole-of-society” approach to U.S. foreign policy should be the norm. Yet in practice, full-spectrum, civil-military (civ-mil), public-private collaboration remains ad hoc and sub-optimized. This is especially true for U.S. engagements in the world’s trickiest places, namely fragile and conflict-affected regions. With the Trump Administration still forming its global strategies and re-shaping how resources and roles are arranged for U.S. foreign policy, comes an opportunity to re-imagine how stakeholders collaborate in countries facing crises. In light of proposed foreign assistance cuts, an expanding defense budget, and a more commercially-inclined Administration, civilian, military, public, and private actors may in fact have no choice but to leverage their comparative advantages like never before.
Friends, not Enemies of the State: Civil Society in Extremist-Affected Nations
“Improving government legitimacy is vital to a just and peaceful Iraq,” Mercy Corps posits in their newly-released “Investing in Iraq’s Peace: How Good Governance Can Diminish Support for Violent Extremism.” The title and the research behind it unsurprisingly affirm what has come to be the prevailing hypothesis in the global Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) discourse: poor governance resulting in marginalization, whether real or perceived, is a key driver of extremism; More so than poverty, religion or ethnicity. Indeed, data collected everywhere from Iraq to Nigeria, Colombia to Afghanistan support this notion. And yet improving governance remains an under-pursued and scarcely funded CVE strategy. Perhaps because improving governance, for many, seems an abstract and onerous objective; and one that extremist-affected states often resist.
This report, however, suggests an indirect approach to improving governance may be a paradoxically straightforward way of targeting extremism: Invest in civil society, and governance will improve, followed, in turn, by a reduction in extremism.
Most of us quietly root for the grassroots NGOs who are demanding improved transparency in weak states, or for watchdog groups exposing state corruption and human rights abuses in an effort to spark reform. But it comes as no surprise that the governance institutions these civil society actors have in their sights, hardly jump at the chance to invest in or empower them. This report suggests, however, maybe they should be.
Mercy Corps' research in Iraq suggests that as the prominence of civil society groups rise, (For example, those who serve as honest brokers between marginalized groups and government bodies) so too do public perceptions of governance. This demonstrates the correlation between civil society and governance. If, by extension, improvements in governance are correlated with drops in extremist sentiment -- as has been documented in contexts around the globe -- it follows that the strengthening civil society may be an indirect way to counter violent extremism.
In Nigeria, a state signaling its earnest desire to counter the extremism promulgated by Boko Haram, the government (and donors and businesses and others) may consider enabling and investing in civil society as an important element in CVE campaigns. In Mali, where a strategy entitled “Civil Society for Human Security” was penned by a consortium of local NGOs, the national government (who has already been the target of AQIM and ethnic extremists), may be well-served listening to and integrating critique offered them by their domestic civil society. In fact, across the globe, naturally defensive officials may find that embracing their critics helps them defeat a far more insidious foe.
The idea that “boosting civil society reduces extremism” remains a vague hypothesis, but Mercy Corps' new research on Iraq, coupled with data from extremist contexts around the world, offer empirical evidence to suggest there is indeed a link. States from the Sahel to the Levant to Latin America to Southeast Asia that each face their own brands of extremism may wish to consider making nice with even the peskiest of NGOs, advocacy groups, or watchdogs. Doing so may spare those governments from a far worse enemy of the state.