In April and May of 2019, a team of Motive International experts composed of Dr. Salamah Magnuson, Morgan Keay and Kimberly Metcalf conducted an investigation of societal dynamics in Estonia through in-country field research focused on social cohesion and national security. The purpose of this initiative was to apply Motive’s Social Contract Assessment Tool (SCAT), a framework designed to identify and characterize social institutions and the sources of legitimacy that underpin them in transitioning or threatened societies in order to inform policies, plans and activities to mitigate threats and promote stability. In the case of Estonia, we focused SCAT research and analysis on three specific threats of concern for U.S., Estonian, NATO and EU actors with whom we spoke, all of which are echoed in regional media and policy analysis: (1) the actual or potential “external threat” of encroachment on Estonia’s sovereignty by the Russian Federation through hybrid warfare; (2) the actual or potential “insider threat” of the country’s significant ethnic Russian minority being exploited or mobilized by anti-state actors; and (3) the actual or potential “existential threats” to Estonian national cohesion as a result of ethno-political social cleavages within the population.
A map of the region situates Estonia with its baltic neighbors to the south, Nordic partners to the north, and Russia to the East
By conducting interviews based on the SCAT framework and producing SCAT-informed analytic products and briefings, we successfully informed policy and practical options for state, multi-national and civil society stakeholders seeking to bolster resilience and counter specific threats confronting this Baltic society-in-transition.
What is the SCAT?
Developed by Motive International and taught in Motive’s Governance/Counter-Governance (Gov/C-Gov) course, the SCAT is an interview guide, analytic framework and data depiction method rooted in the principles of social contract theory. The SCAT is premised on the principle that social contracts are mutually agreed pacts between leaders and followers in society, bound together by three sources of legitimacy: (1) performance (what leaders do for the benefit of followers and what followers must do to receive benefits), (2) processes of exchange (mechanisms by which leaders and follows interact), and most importantly, (3) shared values (common identity and interests that unite leaders and followers) (Keay, 2018). The SCAT’s three-part semi-structured interview guide features non-normative lines of inquiry designed to illuminate and characterize social contracts in a given context and the nuanced sources of legitimacy that underpin them. These insights can then be used to develop SCAT-informed policy or operational recommendations that are highly targeted and rooted in data.
Motive's SCAT framework depicts the three sources of legitimacy that bind leaders and followers together to form social contracts.
Operationally Relevant Social Contracts
In the context of Estonia, we sought to identify and characterize social contracts that are operationally relevant – meaning those with the ability to affect vulnerability or resilience -- to the specific threats named above. We then sought to translate analysis into tailored policy or practical recommendations for stakeholders seeking to counter each threat. To do this, our English-Russian bilingual research team began by conducting interviews with nearly one hundred people in the Tallinn, Narva, Lasnamae and Tartu regions of Estonia. Respondents included government officials, political party leaders, academics, activists, members of civil society organizations (CSOs), security actors -- including members of the Estonian Defense League (Kaitseliit) -- media professionals, and a cross-section of citizens and residents spanning ethnic, gender, socio-economic and generational lines. Interview data allowed us to illuminate and characterize dozens of social contracts relevant to the threats, and uncovered significant— in some cases paradoxical— trends.
Estonian soldiers participate in a NATO combined exercise premised on a conventional or hybrid attack from an adversarial neighbor.
Unsurprisingly, the state-citizen social contract proved operationally relevant to all three threat streams. What surprised us, however, was that the Estonian state’s attempts to form a social contract with ethnic Russian Estonians through the multi-faceted integration agenda was actually backfiring in specific instances.
The integration agenda is operationalized largely through state-funded Estonian language and cultural programs, and is a key manifestation of the Government of Estonia’s (GoE) constitutional mandate to “guarantee the preservation of the Estonian people, the Estonian language and the Estonian culture through the ages” (Constitution of Estonia, 1992). Specifically, the agenda seeks to build a viable and cohesive post-(re)independence nation by facilitating Russian speaking Estonians’ entry into the country’s social and economic mainstream (Kuus, 2002). GoE integration programs are backed substantially by the EU and NATO allies, which makes sense when integration (read: nation-building) is framed explicitly and implicitly as a bulwark against influence or exploitation of the Russian minority by the Kremlin. Institutions implementing integration efforts are therefore intended to counter the actual or potential threat of ethnic Russian Estonians being mobilized into anti-state activities (the “internal threat”). Our data suggest, however, that instead of enticing ethnic Russians into Estonian society, key integration-related institutions may in fact be alienating this target population.
Interview data suggested that at least three GoE, EU and U.S.-funded integration-focused organizations were inadvertently alienating the very Russian speaking Estonians they sought to attract by offering social contracts seen as hostile to, or seeking to replace, the institutions ethnic Russian Estonians hold most dear (i.e. multi-generational ‘conservative’ family households, bi-lingual schools, and cultural institutions associated with Russia, such as the ballet and opera.) For example, SCAT data revealed that contemporary arts programs that sought to bring Estonian and ethnic Russian youth together were perceived by Russian speakers as unappreciative of Russian high culture. Entities that linked integration with ‘progressive’ EU values, namely LGBTQ tolerance, were seen as creating unwanted generational divides between young ethnic Russians who tended to be more tolerant of progressive values, and their more conservative parents and grandparents with whom they lived in the same household. And while Russian speaking Estonians routinely cited Estonian language programs as vital to career advancement, most resented pro-integration policies that restricted the use of Russian or criticized bi-lingual education.
In sum, numerous integration institutions and activities seemed to be deepening social divides, in turn heightening Estonia’s vulnerability to external, internal and existential threats. While this assertion is not entirely new, the SCAT produced novel, more granular insights on the sources of legitimacy within specific institutions with the potential to shape national cohesion and security.
SCAT analysis also helped illuminate a prevailing trend with consequence for all three threat streams: institutions viewed by ethnic Russian Estonians as hostile to their ‘dual identity’ functioned to alienate intended ‘beneficiaries’ of integration, and deepen social cleavages. Our data suggest that the resultant feelings of apartness may create the conditions for anti-state and anti-nation threats to prevail. An extreme example of this is the case of Deniss Matsavas, an ethnic Russian Estonian army officer recruited into spying for the Kremlin while visiting Russia (Weiss, 2019). Matsavas, now serving fifteen years in prison after pleading guilty to treason, exemplifies the paradox of ethnic Russian Estonian apartness: invested in the Estonian state, but perhaps not trusting or trusted enough to turn to Estonian institutions when the stakes are highest.
Protestors take to the streets around the 2019 Estonian parliamentary election, in which the far-right EKRE party secured a place in the coalition government.
The Matsavas case notwithstanding, our data did not suggest that ethnic Russians in Estonia pose a significant insider threat. Where data suggested that social contracts between ethnic Russians and ethnic Estonian institutions were weak, we did not find that Kremlin-back institutions filled the void. To the contrary, we found the vast majority of ethnic Russians to be more skeptical of Moscow than of Tallinn or Brussels, and the vast majority to be deeply committed to bridging -- or benignly resigned to -- the feeling of apartness that it means to be of dual identity in Estonia.
This tolerance for dual identity, however, was not shared by all institutions shaping Estonian society. Ironically, while the narrative of an exploitable ethnic Russian population persists and is characterized in the media and state policy as an “insider threat,” our research revealed a different source of domestic risk.
Just weeks before our team arrived in country, the far-right ethno-nationalist EKRE party had secured nearly 18% of seats in Estonia’s parliamentary election, and through a surprise political maneuver, brokered a place in the country’s three-party governing coalition. Explicitly anti-Russia(n) and anti-immigrant, EKRE’s victory dismayed many Estonians with whom we spoke. Yet data show that the nationalistic language, citizenship and education policies the party champions are reflected in countless other social and cultural institutions viewed favorably by many respondents. By mapping the characteristics and perceptions of these institutions, we identified the meta trend that burgeoning pro-nation systems of authority ironically pose perhaps the most significant threat confronting Estonia: that the country’s inability to forge or sustain a cohesive national identity poses an existential threat to the viability of modern Estonia as a plural, liberal state.
Optimistically, we identified half a dozen institutions who are or could forge unifying social contracts across ethnic lines, including a few that were doing so in a highly intentional manner. Through interviews with management of the Estonian National Football League, we discovered the sports organization was applying social science methodologies to analyze and cater to a pan-ethnic target audience, going as far as adapting the music they broadcast at games to attract multi-generational Russian families and single young ethnic Estonians alike. Data we analyzed about the Estonian Defense League (EDL), a voluntary civil defense network, suggest similar potential for this institution to counter the threat of social cleavages by attracting pan-ethnic nationals around a shared commitment to national defense and unity, even though our findings revealed that what draws each ethnic group to the EDL is distinct (namely, a desire for family readiness and protection among ethnic Russians, and patriotic impulses among ethnic Estonians). Respondents also cited the pan-ethnic appeal of Estonia’s military, police and emergency services sectors as a source of cohesion and resilience.
Turning Research into Action
The authors present preliminary findings at Estonia's University of Tartu. (From L to R: Metcalf, Keay, Magnuson)
Based on our findings, we produced nuanced written and graphical analytic products and presented these to state and civil society institutions. Within two months of concluding fieldwork and briefing stakeholders, at least three national and multi-lateral organizations had revised or were reviewing their strategies, programs and policies. Several described Motive’s analysis as “eye-opening,” “timely,” and key to shaping more effective counter-threat measures, thereby firmly establishing the utility of the SCAT. Beyond methodological validation and regionally specific findings, we believe this initiative has relevance for societies confronting hybrid warfare threats from external adversaries (i.e. states in China, Russia or Iran’s sphere of influence), internal threats from would-be “guerilla partisans” or anti-state actors (i.e. Colombia and the FARC, Nigeria and Boko Haram, etc.), and existential threats stemming from eroded social cohesion (i.e. everywhere, including arguably the contemporary United States). A deliberate SCAT application in these or other contexts would likely produce timely insights and reveal specific opportunities to reduce or mitigate violent and civil conflict alike.
References:
1. Constitution of Estonia. June 1992. https://www.president.ee/en/republic-of-estonia/the-constitution/
2. Keay, Morgan. Shaping Authority in the Human Domain. Special Warfare Magazine. Vol. 31. Issue 4. OCT-Dec 2018.
3. Kuus, Merje. European Integration in Identity Narratives in Estonia: A Quest for Security. Journal of Peace Research. Vol. 39, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp. 91-108
4. Weiss, Michael. The Hero Who Betrayed His Country. The Atlantic. June 26, 2019. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/06/estonia-russia-deniss-metsavas-spy/592417/